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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appellant has asserted that the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j); jurisdiction, however, is subject to argument 
as set forth in Issue IV, infra at 29. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
What is the proper standard of review for the Utah Supreme Court when reviewing 
a trial court's ruling compelling arbitration? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The proper standard of review as to whether a contractual right of arbitration has 
been waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the trial court employed 
the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness, 
but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and the trial 
court's finding in this regard should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which the 
trial court is given deference. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 p.2d 356, 360 
(Utah 1992) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum 
submitted concurrently. .See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. 
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ISSUE II 
Did the trial court properly vacate the default judgment, ordering that the parties 
arbitrate their dispute according to their contractual agreement, and in so ruling find that 
the Appellees had not waived their right to arbitrate? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether a contractual right of arbitration has been waived presents 
mixed questions of law and fact: whether the trial court employed the proper standard of 
waiver presents a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or 
events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and the trial court's finding in this 
regard should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which the trial court is given 
deference. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 p.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum 
submitted concurrently. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. 
ISSUE III 
Did the Appellant lack the requisite equitable standing to assert any equitable 
rights before the District or Supreme Court to support their argument that Appellees have 
in fact waived their right to arbitration? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether Appellant lacks the requisite standing to assert any equitable 
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claims before the Utah Supreme Court in support of their argument that Appellees have in 
fact waived their right to arbitration is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Appellant must show that the trial court exceeded the boundaries set by principles or rules 
of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue was preserved in Appellees' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 
60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and in supporting Memorandum 
submitted concurrently. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. 
ISSUE IV 
Is the Order appealed from a final order under the circumstances of this case, and 
not interlocutory in nature and therefore should the Utah Supreme Court dismiss 
Appellant's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether the district court's order is a final order and not interlocutory 
in nature is a question of law. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This issue of jurisdiction is preserved as a matter of law and can be raised at any 
juncture in the proceedings. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (1985); 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-22a (1991); 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-1 (1985); 
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-3 (1985); 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-4 (1985); 
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-18 (1985); 
California Code of Civil Procedure §1292.2; See Addendum at A-4 
California Code of Civil Procedure §1293; See Addendum at A-5 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3 (1990); 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 (1990); 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 5 (1990); 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) (1985); 
The complete texts of the California statutes appear in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Cedar") and Appellees, 
Sherry Bonelli and Bonelli & Associates (hereinafter referred to as "Bonelli") entered 
into a written contract whereby Bonelli was to perform certain services for Cedar. See 
Addendum at A-1. This contract was negotiated and entered into in San Diego, 
California. The contract itself was fully integrated and completely and fully detailed the 
rights, obligations and responsibilities of each of the parties. See Addendum at A-1. The 
parties foresaw that a dispute might arise in relation to the contract. In order to more 
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effectively deal with any possible dispute, the parties through their mutual assent 
mandated that any such disputes would be submitted to binding arbitration in San Diego, 
California. See Addendum at A-l at Article 4.6. Subsequently, a dispute arose between 
the parties. Thereafter, in contravention of the parties' contract, Cedar brought an action 
in the Fifth Judicial District Court in Iron County, Utah against Bonelli alleging breach of 
contract. See Record at 2-14. Bonelli was served with Service of Process in California on 
or about October 28, 2001. See Record at 19-23 and 24-26. Cedar then took Bonelli's 
default on November 28, 2001 for the Bonelli's failure to respond to the Complaint and 
Summons served on them on or about October 28, 2001. See Record at 29-30. The lower 
court then set a hearing regarding the Notice of Petition for Default Judgment [sic]. The 
hearing was scheduled for January 3, 2002 before the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite. 
See Record at 31-35. Following the hearing on January 3, 2002, Judge Braithwaite 
recused himself and the Honorable Judge Philip J. Eves was assigned to the case. See 
Record at 36-37. Cedar then submitted a Motion for Default Judgment on February 27, 
2002 and attached affidavits of Dr. Russell Olsen and Dr. Chad Anderson. See Record at 
39-40, 41-51 and 52-62. The lower court entered a default judgment against Bonelli on 
March 2, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Cedar then filed and mailed to Bonelli a Notice of 
Entry of Judgment on May 13, 2002. .See Record at 65-68. Bonelli subsequently retained 
the legal services of the Law Firm of Hughes & Bursell, P.C. See Record at 69-70. On 
July 12, 2002 Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for 
Relief from Default Judgment along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
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support of said motion. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. Cedar filed its response to said 
motion on July 22, 2002. .See Record at 91-103. Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration 
and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment was heard on August 12, 2002. 
See Record at 104-105. Following the hearing on Bonelli's motion, the matter was taken 
under submission by the district court. The district court, Eves, J. entered its ruling on 
August 19, 2002 granting Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion 
for Relief from Default Judgment and ordering the parties to submit to arbitration as 
provided in the parties' contract. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2. 
Cedar then filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory 
Order (Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for 
Relief From Default Judgment). See Record 130-132. This Court granted Cedar's 
Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order on October 23, 2002. See 
Record at 134-135. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Cedar filed a Complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and damages on 
September 19, 2001. See Record at 2-14. A default certificate was entered on November 
28, 2001. See Record at 29-30. Subsequently, a default judgment was entered against 
Bonelli on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64. 
Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief 
from Default Judgment on July 12, 2002. See Record at 71-73. The District Court 
entered a ruling granting Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion 
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for Relief from Default Judgment on August 19,2002. See Record at 125-129; see also 
Addendum at A-2. Cedar then filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order (Order Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and 
Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Default Judgment). See Record at 130-132. This 
Court granted said Petition on October 23, 2002. See Record at 134-135. 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court in a memorandum decision granted Bonelli's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment and ordered the 
parties to submit to arbitration as provided in the parties' contract. This order set aside 
the default judgment obtained in contravention of the parties' contract mandating 
arbitration. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties' entered into a contract whereby Bonelli was to perform certain 
services for Cedar. See Addendum at A-1. This contract was negotiated and entered into 
in the State of California. That said contract also contains a mandatory arbitration clause, 
which states the following: 
Should any dispute arise between the parties over any 
provision of this Agreement or over any performance 
of this Agreement, said dispute shall be submitted to 
binding arbitration. This arbitration shall be 
conducted according to the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, but need not necessarily be 
conducted by said organization. Each party shall 
initially equally contribute to the costs of said 
arbitration. During the arbitration, each party shall 
bear its own attorney's fees. Arbitration proceeding 
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shall occur in the city and state of San Diego, 
California. 
See Addendum A-l at Article 4.6. (Emphasis added.) 
Despite said arbitration clause and its mandatory application concerning disputes 
between the parties, Cedar preemptively initiated legal proceedings in Iron County, Utah. 
See Record at 2-14. Bonelli was personally served the complaint and summons on 
October 28, 2001. See Record at 19-23 and 24-26. Bonelli failed to respond to the 
complaint and a default certificate was entered against them on November 28, 2001. See 
Record at 29-30. The court then set a hearing regarding the Notice of Petition for Default 
Judgment. The hearing was scheduled for January 3, 2002 before the Honorable Robert 
T. Braithwaite. See Record at 31-35. Following the hearing on January 3, 2002, Judge 
Braithwaite recused himself and the Honorable Judge Philip J. Eves was assigned to the 
case. See Record at 36-37. Cedar then submitted a motion for default judgment on 
February 27, 2002 and attached affidavits of Dr. Russell Olsen and Dr. Chad Anderson. 
See Record at 39-40, 41-51 and 52-62. The lower court entered default judgment against 
Bonelli on March 5, 2002. See Record at 63-64. Cedar then filed and mailed to Bonelli a 
Notice of Entry of Judgment on May 13, 2002. See Record at 65-68. Bonelli then 
retained the legal services of the Law Firm of Hughes & Bursell, P.C. See Record at 69-
70. On July 12, 2002 Bonelli filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from Default Judgment along with a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of said motion. See Record at 71-73 and 74-90. Cedar filed their 
response to said motion on July 22, 2002. See Record at 91-103. Bonelli's Motion to 
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Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment was set for 
hearing on August 12, 2002. See Record at 104-105. Following the hearing on Bonelli's 
motion the matter was taken under submission by the Court. The Court made its ruling 
on August 19, 2002 wherein Judge Eves granted Bonelli's Motion to Compel Arbitration 
and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment vacating said judgment and 
ordered the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration as provided in the parties' 
contract. .See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at A-2. Cedar then filed a Notice 
of Filing of Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order (Order Re: Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Default Judgment). 
See Record 130-132. The Utah Supreme Court granted Cedar's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal an Interlocutory Order on October 23, 2002. See Record at 134-135. 
Bonelli has not participated in this lawsuit because of its reliance on the parties' 
contract, particularly the mandatory arbitration clause contained therein. Said clause 
clearly requires arbitration in this instance to take place in San Diego, California, and 
mandates that said arbitration follow the guidelines set forth by the American Arbitration 
Association. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
The standard of review under Utah law provides that a determination of whether a 
party has waived a contractual right to arbitration is a mixed question of fact and law. 
Whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question, 
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which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver 
are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, regarding which 
determinations the district court is given deference. It is clear that a substantial amount of 
evidence supports the trial court's ruling. 
ISSUE II 
The trial court properly applied the doctrine of waiver as it relates to its finding 
that Bonelli has not in fact waived its contractual right to arbitration. 
ISSUE III 
Cedar lacks the requisite equitable standing to assert any equitable rights before 
the District or Supreme Court to support its claim that Bonelli has in fact waived its right 
to arbitration. 
ISSUE IV 
The district court's order is a final order and not interlocutory in nature and 
therefore Cedar's appeal should be denied due to lack of jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW COMPEL AFFIRMATION 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
Under Utah law, cases regarding the issue of whether a contractual right to 
arbitration has been waived have been subjected to a mixed standard of review by the 
Utah Supreme Court. This standard is clearly set forth by the Utah Supreme Court as 
follows: 
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[T]he issue of whether a contractual right of arbitration has been 
waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the 
trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a 
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions 
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and 
should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give 
a district court deference. 
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1999); citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). 
Under this standard, this Court must review two aspects of the trial court's 
decision in order to properly determine whether a waiver has occurred. The first aspect of 
the analysis is to review and determine whether the trial court employed the proper legal 
standard to the waiver question. This determination is reviewed for correctness. Id. at 
576. The legal standard in Utah for determining whether a party has waived a contractual 
right to arbitration is clearly delineated in the case of Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 
Id., wherein the Utah Supreme Court set forth two conjunctive criteria for determining 
whether a party had waived its contractual arbitration right. As this standard is delineated 
in the conjunctive, Cedar's failure to establish either of the two criteria mandates 
affirmation of the trial court's decision. The two criteria as set forth by the Chandler 
court are that "waiver . . . must be based on both a finding of participation to a point 
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice." Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). It is clear from the district 
court ruling that the court relied on the proper standard as promulgated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Chandler decision. See Record at 125-129; see also Addendum at 
A-2. 
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The next aspect of the standard of review analysis is the review of the district 
court's findings re: "actions or events allegedly supporting waiver", which findings are 
reviewed as factual determinations and therefore given deference by the appellate 
tribunal. Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 576 (Utah 1999); citing Chandler v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992). The record as reflected by the district 
court's ruling contains ample support for the district court's finding that Bonelli has not 
waived its contractual right to arbitration. 
ISSUE II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT BONELLI HAS NOT 
WAIVED ITS CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO ARBITRATION. 
i. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS CONTRACTUALLY AGREED 
ARBITRATION IN UTAH 
The parties' contract is clearly an integrated written agreement whereby Cedar and 
Bonelli agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration in San Diego, California 
instead of through litigation. See Addendum A-l, Article 4.6. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-3 la-3, such an agreement is "valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except 
upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged 
as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-3 (1985). 
Moreover, Utah case law supports a strong public and judicial policy toward encouraging 
arbitration when parties have agreed to do so. For instance, in Robinson & Wells, P.C v. 
Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court unanimously upheld a state 
district court judgment confirming an arbitrator's award. Id. at 849. As part of its 
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reasoning, the Robinson decision recognized that "the policy of our law favors arbitration 
as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes." Id. at 846. In Robinson, 
the Utah Supreme Court also noted that in Utah, statutory provisions regarding arbitration 
had been in existence since 1884. Id. The Robinson court, in referring to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-3 la-1, significantly noted that the Utah Legislature had amended the 
Arbitration Act "to permit valid an enforceable agreements [to arbitrate] for future as well 
as present disputes." Id. The amendment was earlier held to be constitutional by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1981), a decision that provides additional evidence of Utah's "strong public policy 
in favor of arbitration as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling 
disputes and easing court congestion." Robinson & Wells, P.C v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 
846 (Utah 1983). 
Recently, this Court in Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 
40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002), again reasserted Utah's long standing policy of encouraging 
arbitration by stating, "it is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of 
arbitration, 'in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes 
when the parties have agreed not to litigate.'" Id. at 606. See also Reed v. Davis County 
Sck Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. 
Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986)); See also McCoy v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901 (Utah 2001) ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a 
manner that favors arbitration." (quoting DocutelPlivetti Corp., 731 P.2d at 479)); See 
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also Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992) (stating "this 
court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 'as an approved, 
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.' "). 
Given Utah's well recognized and articulated preference for arbitration, and the 
fact that these parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate all disputes under the 
contract, the Utah Supreme Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and thereby affirm 
the parties' contractual and agreed upon duty to arbitrate their dispute. 
ii. UTAH LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING COMPELLING ARBITRATION. 
Bonelli presents the parties' contract as convincing and indisputable evidence of 
the existing arbitration agreement between the parties. See Addendum A-l, Section 4.6. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 la-4, upon demonstrating the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, district courts are mandated to order the parties to arbitrate and stay 
any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. In 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "[wjhere the evidence relating to a purported 
agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has no discretion under the statue. 
It must compel arbitration." McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901, 904 
(Utah 2001) (Emphasis Added). The arbitration language contained in the agreement, 
which pertains to all disputes arising out of or connected with the contract, persuasively 
establishes that the very issues of the instant case are clearly subject to arbitration, and not 
judicial resolution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already clarified that, "[w]hen 
parties agree to arbitrate, they waive the substantial right to judicial resolution of the 
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disputes." McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 20 P.3d 901, 904 (Utah 2001); citing 
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998). Based on the foregoing, Bonelli 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling as supported by Utah 
code and case law and in accordance with the parties' integrated and unambiguous 
written contract. 
The fact that the current case disposition required the trial court to set aside a 
default judgment taken by Cedar in avoidance of its written agreement should not 
dissuade this Court from affirming the trial court's decision. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 
P.2d 572 (Utah 1999), the district court entered judgment in favor of Dr. Pledger pursuant 
to his motion for summary judgment for services rendered to his patient Gillespie. 
Subsequently, Gillespie's named third party defendant and insurer Cigna, joined in the 
lawsuit. Cigna, twenty-eight months after summary judgment had been entered against 
Gillespie, moved the District Court to compel arbitration alleging that Dr. Pledger's 
payment dispute was covered under an arbitration agreement through Cigna's Health 
plan. Id. at 575. The district court denied Cigna's motion, ruling "that due to the delay 
between the time Cigna learned of the payment dispute and the date it sought to compel 
arbitration, Cigna had waived its right to resolve the dispute through arbitration." Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court, however, Russon J. held in a unanimous opinion that Cigna had not 
waived its right under the agreement to arbitrate the payment even though more than two 
years had passed since the time Cigna was made aware of the lawsuit and the summary 
judgment entered against Cigna's insured. In so holding, the Pledger Court, referring to 
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Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah 1992), stated as follows: 
In Chandler, we set forth the two-pronged standard for 
determining whether a party has waived a contractual right of 
arbitration: "Waiver ... must be based on both [i] a finding of 
participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent 
to arbitrate and [ii] a finding of prejudice." 833 P.2d at 360 
(brackets added). We elaborated that "mere delay" in asserting 
a right to arbitration is not enough to support waiver, see id. at 
359; rather, the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate 
actual prejudice or real harm resulting from the delay, such as 
being disadvantaged in arbitration through participation in 
pretrial procedures or incurring expenses that would not have 
been incurred in arbitration, e.g., preparing to argue important 
pretrial motions or conducting discovery not available in 
arbitration. See id. at 359-60.Under these standards, the district 
court erred in ruling that Cigna had waived its right to arbitrate 
the payment dispute. 
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999). 
Indeed, though Cigna had been named and served in the lawsuit more than two 
years earlier, and had copied all of the district court files, actively attempting to resolve 
the suit, the Utah Supreme Court found that Cigna "had not participated at all in the 
underlying litigation." Id. at 577. Ultimately, Cigna's first and only acts taken in the 
litigation were comprised solely of two motions, one to compel arbitration and, corollary 
thereto, one to set aside the summary judgment. 
Beyond finding Cigna did not participate, the Utah Supreme Court further found 
that Plaintiff, Dr. Pledger was not prejudiced, which is the second prong or criterion of 
the waiver test as stated by this Court in Pledger. 
Dr. Pledger has made no showing that he will be negatively 
impacted by arbitrating the dispute at this juncture. Dr. Pledger 
does not contend that he will be disadvantaged in arbitration by 
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having participated in the litigation in district court. Moreover, 
Dr. Pledger has not established that he incurred significant 
expenses in the district court litigation that would not have been 
incurred in arbitration. 
Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999) 
Cedar, in the case at hand, has not made a single reference to any way in which it 
has or will be prejudiced by arbitrating this dispute and has utterly failed to overcome the 
second criterion in establishing Bonelli's waiver of its contractual rights to arbitration. 
In Pledger, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded the case to 
the district court for entry of an order setting aside the summary judgment and directing 
the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. Id. at 578. In the instant case, Cedar 
obtained a default judgment against Bonelli instead of a summary judgment; however, 
this distinction is de minimis and indeed required less effort by Plaintiff. Consistent with 
Pledger, the Utah Supreme Court should now affirm the trial court's ruling mandating 
contractual arbitration. Indeed, Bonelli's initial appearance took exactly the same 
position as Cigna's. Bonelli entered the litigation and the first and only motion filed with 
the district court was one that sought to set aside a default judgment and compel the 
parties to arbitrate as per their written agreement. Cedar seems more intent upon placing 
blame squarely on Bonelli, when it was Cedar's choice to completely ignore the terms of 
the fully executed and integrated contract and initiate the underlying lawsuit. 
iii. BONELLI HAS NOT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO 
ARBITRATION 
The Utah Supreme Court held that a party waives the right to binding arbitration 
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where that party substantially participates in the litigation process and the participation 
results in prejudice to the opposing party. In determining waiver, it is clear that the trial 
court must first conduct a factual inquiry as to whether the party seeking to enforce 
arbitration has substantially participated in the litigation process. This can be satisfied by 
looking at the various actions of the party seeking to enforce arbitration, and deciding 
whether those actions evidence participation to a point inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate. See Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 609 
(Utah 2002). It stands to reason that "participation" would logically consist of actions 
that evidence a party's intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress 
through litigation, as well as a party's involvement in discovery, pretrial procedures and 
submitting pleadings to invoke the court's judicial authority. Id. at 609. However, even 
when there exists evidence of participation in the litigation process, the Chandler test 
additionally requires that such participation be inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate 
before waiver can be considered. In other words, a mere finding of participation is not 
conclusive. Participation in the litigation must be of the type and nature which, when 
objectively observed, suggests that the party does not want to arbitrate the dispute. 
Illustrative of this point is this Court's reasoned decision in Central Florida 
Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the defendants had not waived their contractual right to arbitrate 
despite having previously filed both (1) an answer and a counterclaim and (2) a motion to 
dismiss prior to filing the motion to compel arbitration. In fact, the defendants' answer in 
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Central Florida Investments, Inc. did not even mention arbitration, and though the motion 
to dismiss raised four arguments, none of those arguments expressly articulated 
arbitration as a reason for dismissing the action. Significant also is the notion that the 
Parkwest Defendants in counterclaiming took what could be construed as a desire to 
litigate rather than arbitrate the dispute. Nevertheless, this Court found that the 
defendants "did not participate in litigation to such an extent that it acted inconsistently 
with the intent to arbitrate." Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 
40 P.3d 599, 609 (Utah 2002). 
In applying the Chandler test to the facts of the case at bar, Bonelli's actions in no 
way demonstrated an intent to disregard or waive their right to arbitrate. Bonelli had not 
participated in the litigation process whatsoever and Cedar can in no way satisfy the first 
prong of Chandler, which requires not only participation but substantial participation. 
Clearly, Bonelli's actions taken as a whole demonstrate an unwillingness and reluctance 
to participate in litigation and an intent to arbitrate. In fact, Bonelli's first appearance in 
this case was initiated by filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration. Based on these actions, 
the trial court reasonably concluded that Bonelli had not substantially participated in the 
litigation process to a point inconsistent with arbitration, and therefore, had not waived its 
contractual right to arbitration. 
Not only has Bonelli born their burden in supporting the first prong of the 
Chandler test, which prong alone supports affirmation of the trial court's opinion, this 
Court may also look to other grounds to support the trial court's determination that the 
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default be set aside and arbitration mandated. The Chandler case allows yet a second 
prong or criterion to be examined and Cedar's failure to establish that prong is also fatal 
to its appeal and supports the trial court's ruling. That prong is the burden Cedar bears of 
showing that it was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling as "prejudice" is defined by Utah 
case law. Clearly, in obtaining a default judgment, Cedar has expended a minimum 
amount of effort and resources. As a corollary to the default judgment, however, no 
discovery process or pre-trial motions were made nor were any claims severed or limited. 
Consequently, Cedar has not been prejudiced by Utah law. 
A clear example of comparable circumstances of "non-prejudice" is found in 
Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). In 
that case the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation and application of an 
arbitration agreement. Central Florida Investments, Inc. (hereinafter "CFI") entered into 
a real estate purchase contract with Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek Associates 
(hereinafter "PWA"). The real estate purchase contract contained an arbitration clause 
for the resolution of any disputes arising under the contract. Subsequently, a dispute 
arose and CFI filed an action on November 9, 1999, against PWA alleging breach of 
contract and requesting specific performance among other things. CFI also filed a lis 
pendens against the property subject to the real estate purchase contract. PWA answered 
the complaint on December 13, 1999 making no mention of the arbitration agreement, but 
counterclaimed against CFI in which PWA first raised the issue of arbitration. PWA also 
filed a motion to dismiss and requested a release of the lis pendens on the same day its 
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answer was filed. On February 28, 2000 the trial court granted PWA's motion to dismiss 
with respect to specific performance and ordered released the lis pendens but did not 
dismiss CFFs request for damages as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Prior to 
the court's entry of the February 28th order, the parties initiated the early stages of 
discovery including the filing of a scheduling order and the service of initial disclosures 
by PWA on CFI. On March 9, 2000, PWA filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial 
court denied the motion. PWA then filed an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Utah Supreme Court addressed two issues in its opinion. First, did the parties agree to 
arbitrate their disputes and second did PWA waive their right to arbitration. The Court 
held that the contract did require arbitration and that PWA had not waived their right to 
arbitration. See Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 
610 (Utah 2002). The Court discussed at length the first prong of the Chandler analysis, 
but what is even more revealing is the footnote to a rather brief review of the second 
prong of the Chandler analysis requiring that the party seeking to prove waiver also show 
that they have been prejudiced by the other party's participation. The Supreme Court 
noted the following explanation: 
Arguably CFI was prejudiced in a sense, in that PWA gained an 
advantage by having CFFs complaint for specific performance 
dismissed. Under the agreement, however, CFI had no right to 
file the complaint for specific performance with its 
accompanying lis pendens. The parties should have been sent 
to arbitration, with neither party presenting anything before the 
district court for consideration and decision. Thus, where CFI 
actually was not entitled to bring the complaint, having it 
dismissed, along with the lis pendens, is not a legal detriment in 
this case. 
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Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 611 (Utah 2002). 
This analysis can easily be extended to the case at hand. Cedar can simply replace 
CFI in the Court's analysis. If that is done, the Court's analysis would read in part as 
follows: "Under the agreement Cedar had no right to file the complaint. . . The parties 
should have been sent to arbitration, with neither party presenting anything before the 
district court for consideration and decision. Thus, where Cedar was not entitled to bring 
the complaint, having it dismissed, along with the default judgment, is not a legal 
detriment in this case." Id. at 611. (Italics added to note change and emphasis) Cedar is 
simply unable to show or prove that it has been prejudiced in any way by Bonelli's non-
participation in the underlying litigation pursuant to the Utah standard of "prejudice". 
Thus, beyond being unable to satisfy the first prong of Chandler regarding 
"substantial participation", Cedar also has not proven or even mentioned any way in 
which it has been prejudiced. 
Interestingly enough, by agreeing to arbitration, both parties are held to have 
waived their right to adjudicate the alleged dispute. See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P„2d 
796, 799 (Utah 1998) ("When parties agree to arbitrate, they waive the substantial right to 
judicial resolution of the disputes.") Cedar alone seeks to avoid the effect of this waiver. 
Thus, in precipitously filing their complaint in the first instance, Cedar was attempting to 
shop an alternate state forum and indeed a different manner of dispute resolution in clear 
abrogation of its contract. 
Cedar, in support of its claim of waiver, has inappropriately directed this Court's 
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attention to a West Virginia case that, as explained by Cedar, seems to support its 
proposition that if someone does not participate in a lawsuit and a default judgment is 
taken against them, that party has in fact waived their right to arbitration. The case cited 
by Cedar is State of West Virginia ex re I. Bar den and Robeson Corp. v. Hill, 539 S.E.2nd 
106 (W.V. 2000). The entire text of this case is attached hereto as A-3 of the addendum. 
Cedar's reliance on this case is precarious at best. The West Virginia case is similar 
factually, but the legal basis and foundation upon which it is based is entirely different 
than the case at bar. West Virginia is one of approximately twenty-seven (27) states that 
have not enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act and, furthermore, has no codified codes or 
statutes that apply to the general application of arbitration to legal disputes. The West 
Virginia code makes sporadic and cursory references to arbitration only in terms of 
specific situations. Utah, on the other hand, is one of approximately thirty-three (33) 
states that have enacted in one form or another the Uniform Arbitration Act. The 
Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted in Utah contains the following sections that clearly 
distinguish Utah from West Virginia in at least one critical area: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-3 (1985) states: A written agreement 
to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is 
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when 
fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3 la-4 (1985) states in pertinent part: The 
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an 
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration 
agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the agreement, 
the court shall determine those issues and order or deny 
arbitration accordingly. 
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The above noted statutes clearly delineate that the standards and foundation upon 
which the Utah Courts are working are wholly and substantially different than those used 
by the West Virginia courts. Furthermore, under the West Virginia Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the West Virginia courts have determined that arbitration is an affirmative 
defense that must be raised in the answer to any complaint if the party seeks to enforce 
arbitration. The Utah courts, however, have consistently held that failure to raise a valid 
arbitration clause in initial and even subsequent court filings does not, in and of itself, 
nullify the existence or enforceability of the arbitration clause. In West Virginia, failure 
to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense may lead the courts to determine that the 
party has waived the right to arbitrate. On the other hand, for those approximately thirty-
three (33) jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, not one of them 
requires arbitration to be plead as an affirmative defense or considers the right to arbitrate 
waived if the "defense" is not raised. 
Multiple other jurisdictions share Utah's basic framework for deciding whether a 
party has waived a contractual right to arbitration. The Court of Appeals in Texas in the 
case ofHouston Lighting & Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366 
(Tex. App. 1995) outlined the standard of waiver in the following language: "For a party 
to waive the right to arbitration, that party must take action inconsistent with its right to 
arbitration, and the party claiming waiver must be prejudiced." Houston Lighting & 
Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366, 370; citing Psarianos v. 
Standard Marine, Ltd, 728 F. Supp. 438, 449 (E.D. Tex. 1989). 
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In Houston Lighting the Texas Court of Appeals found that the Plaintiff, Houston 
Lighting & Power Company had in fact waived the right to arbitrate, but that Court's 
analysis was in line with the standard as set forth and as promulgated by this Court. In 
that case four entities entered into an agreement in 1973 that called for the settlement of 
disputes to be resolved through arbitration. The four entities were: Houston Lighting and 
Power Company, Central Power and Light Company, the City of San Antonio and the 
City of Austin. Following the execution of this original agreement, a dispute arose 
between Houston Lighting and Power Company and Central Power and Light Company 
in the early 1980's. In settling this earlier dispute, both Houston Lighting and Power 
Company and Central Power and Light Company agreed that future disputes between 
them would not be subject to the arbitration clause in the original agreement. In 1993 a 
subsequent dispute arose among Houston Lighting and Power Company and the 
remaining two parties to the original agreement. The City of Austin and the City of San 
Antonio brought suit seeking declaratory judgment and Houston Lighting and Power 
Company sought to compel arbitration as provided for in the original agreement. The 
Texas Court of Appeals found that Houston Lighting and Power Company had waived its 
right to arbitrate upon entering into its settlement agreement with Central Power and 
Lighting Company in 1992, which specifically stated that all future disputes between 
Central Power and Lighting Company and Houston Lighting and Power Company would 
not be subject to arbitration. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled as follows: "We would 
not favor a construction under which the rights of one of the parties to the contract could 
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be determined even in that party's rightful absence from the arbitration proceeding." 
Houston Lighting & Power Company v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366, 371. The 
Texas Court of Appeals held that Houston Lighting and Power Company had in fact 
waived its right to arbitration and could not selectively enforce it based upon the 
particular facts of the case. 
Furthermore, similar phraseology to that found in Utah has been adopted by the 
North Carolina courts. In the case of Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1998) the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated as follows: "Our Supreme Court has 
held that the party opposing arbitration must prove that it was prejudiced by its 
adversary's delay or by actions of the adversary which were incompatible with 
arbitration." Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); citing Sturm v. 
Schamens, 392 S.E.2d 432, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). This standard references Utah 
principles though in one significant aspect is dissimilar to Utah law as it is in the 
disjunctive. Simply stated, in Utah, a party seeking to negate another party's contractual 
right to arbitration must overcome both burdens. As to the element of prejudice, the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1998) further outlined several examples of what may constitute prejudice as follows: 
A party may be prejudiced by [its] adversary's delay in seeking 
arbitration if (1) it is forced to bear the expense of a long trial, 
(2) it loses helpful evidence, (3) it takes steps in litigation to its 
detriment or expends significant amounts of money on the 
litigation, or (4) its opponent makes use of judicial discovery 
procedures not available in arbitration. 
Sullivan v. Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118, 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); citing Servomation Corp. v. 
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Hickory Construction Co., 342 S.E.2d 853,854 (N.C. 1986). 
The North Carlina court in Sullivan found that the party objecting to arbitration did 
not in fact suffer prejudice and therefore the right to arbitrate was not waived. Sullivan v. 
Bright, 497 S.E.2d 118,121 (N.C. 1998). 
The above-noted cases detail and offer a snapshot of the standards used by other 
jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act in whole or in part. The 
standard as adopted by this Court is in accordance with various other jurisdictions and, 
based upon that standard, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling and thereby 
compel these parties to arbitrate their dispute as per their written contract. 
ISSUE III 
IN ORDER FOR CEDAR TO ASSERT ANY EQUITABLE RIGHTS 
BEFORE THIS COURT THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO FIRST DO 
EQUITY. 
There is a legal maxim that has been adopted and applied by Courts across the 
country that states: "He Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity." Both parties, or their 
authorized agents, signed the contract and agreed to its terms and provisions. Cedar was 
aware of the mandatory arbitration provision prior to starting this precipitous court action 
in a state forum contrary to the contractual terms, but Cedar decided to conscientiously 
ignore the arbitration provision. Why? Perhaps to avail themselves of the fact that 
Bonelli resides out-of-state from Cedar's chosen forum and would not understand that 
lower courts are burdened and not prone to assert sua sponte advocacy for arbitration, 
which the contract specifies. Cedar filed their default certificate without any need for 
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discovery or use of pretrial motions. Enforcement of a Utah judgment, if pursued, would 
in all likelihood require domestication of that judgment in California, the contractually 
designated forum in the first instance. Such machinations and avoidance of contractual 
obligations should not be given deference by the Courts of Utah and amount to little more 
than forum shopping. Ultimately, such conduct falls outside the bounds of fair play and 
in no way promotes justice. 
It is apparent throughout Cedar's brief that its main contention is that Bonelli 
ignored the proceedings to such an extent that contrary to established case law, this Court 
should hold that Bonelli has in fact waived its right to arbitration. Cedar goes to great 
lengths to belabor this point making reference after reference to the fact that Bonelli has 
failed to participate in any respect in the underlying litigation. Basically, Cedar argues 
that Bonelli has acted in such an egregious manner that Bonelli should not be rewarded 
for its inaction. 
However, as has been thoroughly established throughout legal history "one who 
seeks equity must first do equity." With that simple maxim in mind, one must look at and 
examine the actions of Cedar in this matter. The Honorable Judge Eves of the Fifth 
District Court staled in a footnote to his ruling that: "Plaintiffs disregard for the 
mandatory arbitration clause could be viewed as a breach of the parties' contract." See 
Addendum at A-2 at page 4. Cedar sought to completely disregard the terms of its own 
fully integrated and complete contract in an apparent attempt to secure a judgment in a 
forum foreign to the contractually agreed upon one. Had Cedar simply complied with its 
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own contract, then this entire suit would have been avoided. Therefore, Cedar's 
contention that Bonelli has in some way acted in bad faith is trumped and superseded by 
the fact that this entire process would not have taken place had Cedar not breached the 
contract to begin with. To focus only on Bonelli's actions and simply ignore Cedar's 
actions would be to defy the well established laws of equity stating again that "one who 
seeks equity must first do equity." 
ISSUE IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS A FINAL ORDER AND NOT 
INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE AND THEREFORE CEDAR'S APPEAL 
SHOULD BE DENIED DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
The trial court's ruling vacating the default judgment and mandating arbitration 
was a final order and not subject to an interlocutory appeal. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines that: "An appeal may be 
taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
appeal for all final orders and judgments..." Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 (1990) 
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: "In a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 4 (1990) 
Appellant, however, brought this appeal under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure which provides for: "An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
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sought by any party filing a petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days after 
the entry of the order of the trial court. . . . " Utah R. App. P. Rule 5 (1990) 
Rule 5 additionally provides that: "A timely appeal from an order certified under 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines is not final 
may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be considered by the appellate court as a 
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.55 Utah R. App. P. Rule 5 (1990) 
(Emphasis Added) 
As is clearly delineated above, a litigant seeking an interlocutory appeal from a 
final order does not endow this Court with jurisdiction to hear the matter and such a 
petition does not toll the running of the time limit to perfect an appeal from the final order 
or judgment. However, a litigant who files an appeal as if from a final order or judgment 
when in fact the appeal is from an interlocutory order endows the appellate court, 
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the discretion to treat 
that appeal as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. However, the 
Courts view this as extraordinary relief and to date there is not a single reported case 
where the Court has exercised this discretion. Therefore, Cedar had thirty (30) days 
following the entry of the order to perfect their appeal, which Cedar failed to do. Cedar 
incorrectly chose instead to pursue their appeal under Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
In most cases, appeals from an order mandating arbitration are in fact interlocutory 
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in nature. Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-4(3) states that: "An order to submit an 
agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to 
arbitration under the agreement." Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-4(3) (1985) (Emphasis 
Added) The literal interpretation of this section of the Utah Code would seem to support 
the position that the Court from which the order or ruling compelling arbitration was 
entered would retain jurisdiction over the matter. This position is further illustrated by 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-18 which states as follows: 
If an arbitration agreement provides that arbitration be held in a 
specified county, the district court of that county has jurisdiction 
to hear the initial motion for arbitration. If no provision is made, 
hearing on the initial motion for arbitration shall be before the 
district court of the county where the adverse party resides or 
has a place of business or, if the adverse party has no residence 
or place of business in this state, in the county in which the 
adverse party is served. Unless the court with jurisdiction 
otherwise orders, all subsequent motions or hearings incident to 
the arbitration proceeding shall be heard by the court hearing the 
initial motion. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-18 (1985) 
However, under the circumstances of this case, this code section illustrates the fact 
that the Utah Court retained no jurisdiction over this matter, once the ruling compelling 
arbitration was entered. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-18, the county in 
which arbitration is to be held has jurisdiction over the underlying matter. Cedar, as has 
been detailed at length above, precipitously commenced this action in a forum that was 
not only contrary to the fully integrated and executed contract, but in a forum that 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-3 la-18 had no initial jurisdiction over the matter, 
given the existence of the mandatory arbitration clause in the parties9 contract, which 
specifically mandated that arbitration was to take place in San Diego, California. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held in the case of Salt Lake City 
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Corporation v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, (Utah 1979) what constitutes a final order or 
judgment. The court held that "[a] judgment is final when it ends the controversy 
between the parties." Id. at 539. Clearly, one may argue that the trial court's ruling did 
not "end the controversy between the parties" because it simply mandated that the parties 
arbitrate their dispute. In most instances such a mandate would not serve as a final order, 
but in this case it cannot be viewed any other way. In ordering the parties to arbitrate 
their dispute according to the terms of the contract, the Utah trial court divested itself 
from any further jurisdiction. Consequently, so far as the Utah Courts are concerned, the 
controversy between the parties in Utah is over. Utah statutes as detailed above support 
the proposition that when the trial court mandated arbitration, it retained no further 
jurisdiction over the matter because of the parties' contract, which specifically references 
the agreed upon forum for arbitration as San Diego, California. This locus mandates that 
the California courts would assume all further jurisdiction in this matter. Any case in 
Utah would thus be initiated, if at all, by domestication of a California judgment entered 
after arbitration pursuant to chapter 22a of Title 78 of the Utah Code. 
Therefore, the Utah Courts retained no jurisdiction over the matter and 
consequently, the ruling handed down by the trial court was final. In light of the 
foregoing and under the particular circumstances of this case, the Utah Supreme Court 
should hold that the ruling is a final order and, as such, Cedar failed to perfect its appeal 
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Additionally, California law is further illustrative of this point and supports 
Bonelli's position that the Utah Courts retained no jurisdiction over this matter once it 
compelled the parties to arbitrate their dispute. As California is the contractually 
designated forum for the arbitration, it would be helpful to determine what California law 
has to say on the issue of arbitration and its enforcement and procedure. California Code 
of Civil Procedure §1292.2 states the following: "Any petition made after the 
commencement or completion of arbitration shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction 
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in the county where the arbitration is being or has been held . . . . " Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§1292.2 (West 1993) See Addendum at A-4 Therefore, following the Utah trial court 
mandating arbitration, the Utah trial court retained no jurisdiction over the matter. The 
parties were mandated to commence arbitration in the contractually agreed upon forum of 
San Diego, California. Any further proceedings in relation to any arbitration award, 
judgment or order is rightfully under the jurisdiction of the California courts and more 
specifically the courts located in the county of San Diego. This would include, but not be 
limited to petitions to confirm, amend, vacate, set aside, correct and/or enforce the 
arbitration award as well as including any petitions brought during the arbitration related 
to discovery or other arbitration procedures. 
Additionally, California Code of Civil Procedure §1293 provides the following: 
The making of an agreement... providing for arbitration to be 
had within this State shall be deemed a consent of the parties 
thereto to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enforce 
such agreement by the making of any orders provided for in this 
title and by entering of judgment on an award under the 
agreement. 
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1293 (West 1961); See Addendum at A-5. 
Cedar entered into a fully integrated contract whereby the parties mutually agreed 
that any dispute arising thereunder would be subject to arbitration in San Diego, 
California. In so agreeing, Cedar accepted and acknowledged the jurisdiction of the 
California Courts relating to the enforcement of said agreement or the entering of any 
judgment that may or may not be awarded though arbitration. Consequently, upon the 
Utah trial court's ruling setting aside the default judgment and compelling the parties to 
arbitrate, the Utah trial court retained no jurisdiction over this matter and for all intents 
and purposes transferred all further jurisdiction of this matter to the California courts. 
This position as detailed above is supported by not only the code of Utah, the forum state 
of the underlying proceedings, but is further supported by the code of California, the 
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contractually agreed upon forum for the arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. 
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court should hold that Cedar has failed to 
perfect its appeal and that the Utah Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling in the instant case is amply supported by the record and by 
Utah code and case law. Cedar has failed to prove that Bonelli waived its contractual 
right to arbitration by failing to bear the burden of showing that Bonelli participated in the 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and by failing to show any way 
in which Cedar was prejudiced. Further, Cedar lacks the requisite clean hands to pursue 
any equitable remedy. Ultimately, the order from which the interlocutory appeal was 
taken was a final order and Cedar has failed to timely perfect its appeal. 
Consequently, Bonelli respectfully requests that the Utah Supreme Court affirm 
the trial court's ruling compelling the parties to settle their dispute by arbitration on either 
a factual analysis, on equitable grounds or by declining jurisdiction altogether. 
/ 
DATED this / V clay of May, 2003. 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES 
HUGHES & BURSELL, P.C. 
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Cedar S urgery Center, LLC* 
hereinafter referred to as "CLIENT." 
ARTICLEI: CONSULTANT'S PROVISIONS AND OBLIGATIONS 
1.1 CONSULTANT agrees to provide the services as outlined in Initial Project DevdopmentSenices, 
Exhibit A, 
12 NOTICE: No assurances are being given in the complete acquisition of all third party payor 
contracts. Contracting goals will be to 
(a) Conduct initial suney of potential payors, 
(b) Generate list of individual potential payors with associatedfee schedule. 
(c) Kefine list of individual potential payors, including names and addresses of 
contact persons and proposed payment methodology. 
(d) Obtain approval from Client of potential payors, including, without limitation, 
approval of proposed payment methodology. 
1.3 CONSULTANT expressly acknowledges that it shall have no power or authority to execute any 
Contracts or binding obligations of any nature on behalf of the Client or the Center and that all 
such contracts and obligations must be approved and undertaken directly by the Client an&br the 
Center, as applicable. 
A-l 
AGaA Initials: B&A: 
ARTICLE 27: CLIENT OBLIGATIONS 
11 CLIENT agrees to pay forsenices prouded by Bondli & Associates based upon the rate structure 
and payment schedule as outlined below: 
$ 4,000,00 Commencement Deposit 
$3,800.00 August 1,2000 
$ 3,800-00 September 1,2000 
$ 3,800.00 October 1,2000 
$ 3,800.00 November 1,2000 
$ 3,800.00 December 1,2000 
All reasonable tra>el expenses shall be reimbursed by the Client to Bonelli & Associates 
and are not considered as part of the project fee. Travel expends to included airfare, car 
rental, and lodging. Bondli & Associates will obtain prior written approval of all 
travel expenditures totaling in excess of $ 1,300.00 for a single trip and will promptly 
provide the Client with adequate records and other documentary evidence required to 
substantiate such expenditures as business expenditures for tax purposes. 
ARTICLE JOT: EFFECTIVE DATE AND TERM OF CONTRACT 
3,1 Effective Date: The effective date of this agreement shall be July 24,200tt 
32 Term of Agreement: The term of this Agreement sh all be from July 24,2000 until 
final payment is received by consultant for all senices provided and additional expenses 
incurred* 
3-3 Ternination Without Cause: Either party may terminate this Agreement without cause. A 30 
day notice must be given by either party, before the date of termination becomes effective. 
3.4 Effects of Ternination: Upon termination of the contract the following events will occur: 
(a) Client agrees to pay for all fees for services rendered to date. Payment to be 
received 30 days from date of termination notice. 
(b) Consultant agrees to provide an immediate invoice for any outstanding fee or 
expenses upon receipt of termination notice. 
(c) Consultant agrees to provide client with copies of all records generated on 
client's behalf* Records to be provided upon receipt of final payment to 
consultant 
A-l 
AGa£ Initials: B&A: 
ARTICLE IV: GENERAL PROVISIONS 
4A Agreement' This agreement has been presented to authorized representatives of both parties 
who have reviewed it and agree upon the terms and conditions set forth herein and to the 
interpretation of said terms and conditions. 
4.2 Independent Contractors The relationship between the consultant and the client is an 
independent contractual relationship. 
4.3 Notice: Any notice under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been 
given when delivered personally to an officer of either party or forty-eight hours after deposited in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed to the parties at the 
address set forth on the signature page or such subsequent address as either party may provide for 
that purpose, 
44 Amendment' Either party reserves the right to modify this Agreement during the contract term 
Modifications shall be effective thirty (30) days after mailing of written notice and shall be deemed 
accepted by the other Party unless written objection to a modification is received by the initiating 
Party within such thirty (30) days. 
4.5 Assignment: Neither this Agreement nor any interest herein shall be assigned, transferred 
or otherwise conveyed by either party without the prior written consent of the other Party, Any 
attempted assignment in violation of this provision shall be void. 
4.6 Arbitration Between Paries: Should any dispute arise between the parties over any provision of 
this Agreement or over any performance of this Agreement, said dispute shall be submitted to 
binding arbitration. This arbitration shall be conducted according to the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, but need not necessarily be conducted by said organization* Each party 
shall initially equally contribute to the costs of said arbitration. During the arbitration, each party 
shall bear its own attorney's fees. Arbitration proceedings shall occur in the city and state of San 
Diego, California. 
IN WETNESS WBEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement effective as of the date 
first abo\e written. 
Bondli & Associates Chad Anderson, MJD. 
221 West Crest Suite 201 Russ Olson, DJPJM* 
A-l 
&cpftdido,iSaI4fomia 92025-1736 . ( / 
Date: Date: 
AGa/3 Initials: B&A: 
A-l 
Exhibit A: FEE & SERVICE SCHEDULE 
COMPREHENSIVE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT SERVICES 
Practice/Insurance Management to Include: 
Strategic Planning and Assessment Consultation Visit 
Practice Analysis/Charge Master orMCO Fee Schedule Development 
Development of Marketing Program 
Preparation ofMCO "RFPs" 
(Includes Payor Survey and Negotiations as Facility Liaison) 
Staff Development(Includes Employee Handbook)) 
SetUp of Inventory Program and Procurement of Purchased Services 
Development of Fiscal Management Policies 
Development of Billing and Collection Policies 
(Includes Staff Workshop during one of two 2 day Onsite Visits 
and Assistance in Selection or Structuring MIS System) 
Development of the Center's Corporate Compliance Program 
Single Specialty $ 8,000,00 1 
Compliance, Certification, Licensure, & Accreditation: 
f Planning and Development of Ambulatory Surgery Center's 
I Compliance with Standards and Regulations for Ambulatory 
J Surgery Centers and Safe Office Practices Including Policy and 
W Procedures Manuals 
I ^ ^Development ofCQI and Risk Management Program 
^ Preparation for Licensure Certification and Accreditation surveys 
Single Specialty S 15,000.00 
Equipment Management (Separate Contract with Scott Farris) 
Services for the selection and determination of Equipment 
Coordinate Installation and SetUp of Equipment 
Single Specialty $ 12,000-001 
* Excludes all travel related expenses; but includes telephone, usual and customary office 
expenses. 




IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CEDAR SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRY BONELLI (individually and dba 
Bonelli & Associates), and BONELLI & 
ASSOCIATES, a California general 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Case No. 010500654 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief for Default Judgment, filed July 12, 2002. Plaintiff 
filed an Opposition thereto on July 22, 2002, and Defendants filed a Reply on July 30, 2002. 
The matter was heard on August 12, 2002, at which time both sides presented argument. 
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having heard the parties' arguments, having reviewed 
the relevant law on the matter, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court now rules as 
follows. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. filed a Complaint against Defendant Sherry 
Bonelli and her partnership on September 19, 2001. Plaintiff had Defendants personally served 
A-2 
-2-
with a Summons and Complaint on October 28, 2001. Defendants did not file an answer, or any 
other response, to the Complaint. Plaintiff took Default against Defendants on November 29, 
2001. Defendants filed the current Motion on July 12, 2002, seeking to enforce a provision of 
the contract between the parties that provided that all disputes between the parties would be 
submitted to binding arbitration. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants waived the right to arbitration by inaction and a complete 
failure to respond in any way to the Complaint. Plaintiff point to the fact that Defendants did not 
assert the right to arbitration until eight (8) months after Default had been taken. 
Defendants argue that there has been no "substantial participation" in this litigation by 
them, and no evidence of an intent to waive arbitration, and thereby no waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. 
Neither party has been able to locate any Utah case law that squarely addresses the factual 
setting of this case. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant here took no steps at all that could be viewed as participation in the litigation, 
let alone substantial steps as required under the law, and cannot be said to have waived the right 
to arbitration. 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 365, 
(Utah 1992), "a waiver occurs when the party seeking arbitration substantially participates in 
litigation, to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and this participation results in 
prejudice to the opposing party." Chandler, at 358. The Court did not define "participation", but 
the clear inference from the case law is that one must answer the complaint or motion the court 
A-2 
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for relief, other than a dismissal, before one can be said to have participated in the litigation. 
In the present case, Defendant did nothing at all when served with the Complaint, which 
resulted in the entry of default. It is difficult to see how Defendant thereby "substantially 
participated" in the litigation. The Chandler court continued, "[t]he party claiming waiver has 
the burden of establishing participation and prejudice." Chandler, at 359. Plaintiffs here argue 
that "Defendants' non-participation was a willful choice not to participate or respond or assert 
defenses or rights (including arbitration rights)..." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, p. 3 
(emphasis in original). It appears the even the Plaintiff agrees that the inaction of the Defendants 
was not participation, but a decision not to participate. 
Additionally, the Chandler court stated that for waiver of the right to arbitration to occur, 
the substantial participation must be "to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate . . .". 
Chandler, at 358. It caimot in good faith be argued that Defendants' choice not to do a thing was 
inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. In fact, the reverse seems more logical. By ignoring the 
litigation, the Defendants would seem to be asserting their right to have the dispute submitted to 
arbitration, rather than to become involved in the litigation filed by the Plaintiff in contravention 
of the contract terms. 
Further, as held by the Utah Supreme Court in Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 
2002UT3,40P.3d599: 
This first part of the Chandler test [determining whether there was substantial 
participation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate] looks at the 
actions of the party seeking arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an 
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through 
litigation. 
Cent. Fla. Invs.. Inc., at [^26, 40 P.3d at 609. 
A-2 
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Here, Defendants certainly took no actions which could be viewed as evidencing "an 
intent to submit to the jurisdiction of the court." 
Because of its determination that the Defendants did not substantially participated in this 
matter, and certainly not to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, the Court need not 
reach the second part of the test set forth in Chandler, whether Plaintiff was prejudiced by 
Defendants actions (or inaction). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants here undertook no action when served with the complaint herein and 
therefore did not participate in the litigation whatsoever, and certainly not to a point that could be 
viewed as "substantial" and "inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate." Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Arbitration is therefore granted, and the parties are ordered to submit to arbitration as 
provided in the parties' contract. 
The Default Judgment entered by this Court is hereby set aside as such judgment was 
obtained in contravention of terms of the parties' contract1, and therefore falls under Rule 
60(b)(6), which provides for relief from judgment "for any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 19th day of August 2002. 
J./RIU? EVES 
District Court Judge 
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[**108] [*165] Petition for Writ of Prohibition. 
McGraw, Justice: 
In this original jurisdiction proceeding, petitioners 
seek a writ of prohibition requiring the Circuit Court of 
Wood County to vacate a default-judgment order entered 
in a breach-of-contract action brought against them by 
respondent Fellowship Baptist Church ("Church"). 
Petitioners assert that the lower court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit due to the 
existence of an arbitration provision in a contract [***3] 
between the Church and petitioner Barden and Robeson 
Corporation ("Barden"). We reject petitioners' request for 
prohibition relief, finding that an agreement to arbitrate a 




The pertinent facts of this case, as stated in the 
pleadings before us, are straightforward. Petitioners were 
involved in designing and constructing an addition to the 
Church's building in Vienna, West Virginia. After the 
work was completed, the Church asserted that the height 
of the ceiling in the basement of the addition was lower 
than what was agreed to. Specifically, it has maintained 
that it specified the ceiling height at nine feet, and that 
while early plans provided by Barden indicated such 
height, the ceiling was subsequently lowered to seven 
feet, eight inches without the Church being given 
adequate notice of such change. 
The work was performed pursuant to two contracts: 
one between the Church and petitioners Bob and Gene 
Hutton, doing business as Ray Builders, Inc.; and another 
between the Church and Barden. The latter contract, 
dated July 30, 1998, contains the following arbitration 
clause: 
Any dispute arising out [***4] of this Agreement 
will be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the 
A-3 
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Rules of the Americem Arbitration Association. The 
Purchaser shall be responsible for all attorneys fees 
incurred as a result of the failure to make timely 
payments to The Barden & Robeson Corporation, 
including legal expenses of Arbitration. The non-
prevailing party shall pay all costs attended to as a result 
of Arbitration. 
The Church maintains, inter alia, that there was no 
agreement to arbitrate due to the fact that the trustees of 
the Church executed a facsimile copy of the contract, 
wherein the small print of the arbitration clause was 
"virtually unreadable as a faxed document." 
Following unsuccessful efforts at negotiating a 
settlement to the dispute, nl the Church brought an 
action against petitioners in the Circuit Court of Wood 
County. There is apparently no dispute that petitioners 
were served with the complaint on April 7, 1999. After 
petitioners failed to respond to the complaint, the Church 
moved for, and on June 1, 1999 was granted, a default 
judgment pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 55. Petitioners 
subsequently moved to set aside the default judgment 
under Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the West [***5] Virginia 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In their motion, petitioners 
relied upon the criteria set forth in syllabus point three of 
Parsons v. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 163 W. Va. 
464, 256 S.E.2d 758 (1979), and asserted they should be 
relieved from judgment because (1) the delay in 
answering the complaint resulted from excusable neglect 
in that Barden was required to engage in the time-
consuming task of retaining local counsel; and (2) the 
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action as a result of the purported agreement to arbitrate. 
n2 [**109] [*166] According to petitioners, the circuit 
court, at a hearing conducted on July 16, 1999, indicated 
its intention to deny this motion. It is unclear as to 
whether an order giving effect to such ruling has ever 
been entered by the court below. 
nl Prior to suit being filed, Barden informed 
counsel for the Church, by correspondence dated 
February 10, 1999, as to the existence of the 
purported arbitration agreement. 
n2 The arguments submitted to this Court, as 
well as those tendered to the circuit court, make 
no distinctions between the various petitioners. 
Upon what theory petitioners Bob and Gene 
Hutton base their attempt to benefit from the 
provisions of Barden's contract with the Church, 
as well as Barden's purported excuse for not 
timely answering the complaint, is not clear. 
However, this is a question that the Court need 
Page 2 
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STANDARD FOR PROHIBITION RELIEF 
In accord with the provisions of W. Va. Code § 53-
1-1 (1923), "'prohibition lies only to restrain inferior 
courts from proceeding in causes over which they have 
no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are 
exceeding their legitimate powers and may not be used as 
a substitute for writ of error, appeal or certiorari.' Syl. pt. 
1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 
(1953)." Syl. pt. 2, Cowiev. Roberts, 173 W. Va. 64, 312 
S.E.2d 35 (1984). Although petitioners in this case may 
have other avenues for challenging the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court, this Court has previously indicated that 
"where it appears that a court is proceeding without 
jurisdiction ... prohibition will issue regardless of the 
existence of other remedies." State ex rel. West Virginia 
Truck Stops, Inc. v. McHugh, 160 W. Va. 294, 302, 233 
S.E.2d 729, 734 (1977). See also Health Management, 
Inc. v. Lindell, W. Va. , 528 S.E2d 762, 767 n.6 
(1999); State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 
149 W. Va. 671, 679, 143 S.E.2d535, 541 (1965); syl. pt 
1, Lake OWoods Club v. Wilhelm, 126 W. Va. 447, 28 
S.E2d 915 (1944). [***7] 
Importantly, "[a] writ of prohibition does not lie in 
the absence of a clear showing that a trial court is without 
jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding ...." Syl. 
pt. 1, in part, Fahey v. Brennan, 136 W. Va. 666, 68 
S.E2dl (1951). See also Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W. Va. 
333, 335, 61 S.E2d 305, 306 (1950) ("the writ will not 
be awarded in cases where it does not clearly appear that 
the petitioner is entitled thereto"); syllabus, Vineyard v 
O'Brien, 100 W. Va. 163, 130 S.E. Ill (1925) ("The writ 
of prohibition will issue only in clear cases, where the 
inferior tribunal is proceeding without, or in excess of, 
jurisdiction.") Thus, we undertake limited review in this 
case to determine whether the circuit court's action in 
entering default judgment against petitioners was 
distinctly outside of its jurisdiction. 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our analysis in this case with the 
fundamental premise that for "a court to hear and 
determine an action, suit or other proceeding it must have 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the 
parties; both are necessary and the absence of either is 
fatal to its jurisdiction. [***8] " Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel 
A-3 
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Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W. Va. 753, 117 S.E2d 610 
(1960). See also syl. pt. 1, McClay v. Mid-Atlantic 
Country Magazine, 190 W. Va. 42, 435 S.E.2d 180 
(1993); syl. pt. 1, Schweppes U.S.A. Ltd. v. Kiger, 158 W. 
Va. 794, 214 SK2d 867 (1975) ("In order to render a 
valid judgment or decree, a court must have jurisdiction 
both of the parties and of the subject matter and any 
judgment or decree rendered without such jurisdiction 
will be utterly void."). In this case, our focus is solely 
upon whether the default judgment entered by the circuit 
court must be vacated for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction, based upon the alleged existence of a 
binding and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. n3 
n3 In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, 
159 W. Va. 200, 210, 220 S.E.2d672, 679 (1975), 
we established the threshold standard by which a 
court may exercise initial jurisdiction over an 
action: 
The requirement of subject matter 
jurisdiction is met initially if: 1) the court has the 
general power to grant the type of relief 
demanded under any circumstances; 2) the 
pleadings demonstrate that a set of facts may 
exist which could arguably invoke the court's 
jurisdiction; and 3) the allegations both with 
regard to the facts and the applicable law are of 
sufficient substance to require the court to make, 
in an adversary proceeding, a reasoned 
determination of its own jurisdiction. 
Barden's arguments are confined to asserting that 
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction in light of the 
arbitration provision in its contract with the 
Church. Consequently, our analysis is limited to 
this claimed defect. 
[***9j [**no] [*167] 
In syllabus point one oi Board of Educ. of Berkeley 
County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 160 W. Va. 473, 236 
S.E2d 439 (1977) [hereafter "Miller II'% we held, in 
pertinent part, that "where parties to a contract agree to 
arbitrate ... all disputes ... arising under the contract, and 
where the parties bargained for the arbitration provision, 
such provision is binding, and specifically enforceable." 
This Court's past cases have recognized that a contract 
provision requiring arbitration of disputes "creates a 
condition precedent to any right of action or suit arising 
under the contract." Syl. pt. 3, in part, Pettus v. Olga 
Coal Co., 137 W. Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952). See 
also State ex rel. Center Designs, Inc. v. Henning, 201 
W. Va. 42, 45, 491 S.E2d 42, 45 (1997) (per curiam) 
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("the parties to a contract may agree that a decision of 
arbitrators or a third person is a condition precedent to 
the right to bring an action upon the contract"). As a 
condition precedent to litigating a dispute in the courts, a 
valid and enforceable arbitration clause "precludes any 
right of action until the procedure has been completed." 
Board ofEduc. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, 
Inc., 159 W. Va. 120, 126, 221 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1975) 
[***10] [hereafter "Miller I"\. 
This more recent view of arbitration as condition 
precedent to litigation has its roots in cases that did, in 
fact, speak of arbitration in jurisdictional terms. At 
common law, an agreement to arbitrate could be revoked 
prior to an award being made. See Miller I, 159 W. Va. at 
122, 221 S.E.2d at 883. This rule was predicated on the 
antiquated notion that arbitration agreements are 
unenforceable because parties cannot, by agreement, oust 
a court of jurisdiction. n4 The only exception was that 
arbitration was not revocable where it was made a 
condition precedent to a right of action. In Condon v. 
South Side R.R. Co., 55 Va. (14 Grat.) 302 (1858), the 
Court explained that 
n4 In Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43, 26 S.E. 
366 (1896), the Court stated that the reason why 
the agreement was revocable under common law 
was, not that arbitration was not favored by it as 
tending to end litigation, and not for want of 
consideration, as the ending of litigation was 
strong consideration, but because of that principle 
of law that parties could not, by agreement, oust 
the courts of their jurisdiction assigned them by 
law, and could not debar themselves from 
appealing to the law and tribunals of the land .... 
Id. at 48, 26 S.E. at 367. 
[***11] 
parties by their contract may lawfully make the 
decision of arbitrators or of any third person a condition 
precedent to a right of action upon the contract. In that 
case such decision is a part of the cause of action. Until 
the decision is made and the cause of action thus 
becomes complete, the courts have no jurisdiction of the 
case, and therefore cannot be said to be ousted of their 
jurisdiction by the contract. 
55 Va. at 314 (emphasis added). In Miller /, however, 
we indicated that this common-law preoccupation with 
"preventing parties by agreement from ousting courts of 
jurisdiction, is frankly archaic." 159 W. Va. at 126, 221 
A-3 
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S.E.2d at 885. In truth, the jurisdictional concepts once 
employed in the arbitration context were nothing more 
than "an illogical remnant of ancient English law." 
DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 76 
(1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). n5 Thus, we reject the 
jurisdictional bent of these older cases. 
n5 The Minnesota Supreme Court long ago 
recognized that Ihere appears never to have been 
any factual basis for holding that an agreement to 
arbitrate "ousted" jurisdiction. It has no effect 
upon the jurisdiction of any court. Arbitration 
simply removes a controversy from the arena of 
litigation. It is no more an ouster of judicial 
jurisdiction than is compromise and settlement or 
that peculiar offspring of legal ingenuity known 
as the covenanl not to sue. Each disposes of 
issues without litigation. One no more than the 
other ousts the courts of jurisdiction. The right to 
a jury trial, even in a criminal case, may be 
waived. So, also, may the right to litigate be 
waived. Such waiver may be the result of contract 
or unilateral action. 
Park Constr. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 
32, 209 Minn. 182, 186, 296 N. W. 475, 477 
(1941). 
[***12] 
The focus of our more modern cases has been upon 
permitting, where appropriate, the enforceability of 
private agreements to arbitrate according to their terms. 
An arbitration agreement is nothing more than a 
contractual arrangement for resolving disputes [**111] 
[*168] by means other than court-supervised litigation. 
As is now widely recognized, such agreements ... are not 
destructive of jurisdiction. They are, precisely, 
agreements, and as such may be pleaded as a personal 
defense. However, like any such right, they may be 
waived. ... Plaintiffs' ... [assertions], to the effect that the 
court has no "jurisdiction" until agreed-on arbitration has 
been conducted, do not concern jurisdiction in the basic 
sense, but stand merely for the proposition that if either 
party seasonably claims his right to arbitrate, the 
agreement must be recognized. 
Morales Rivera v. Sea Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 418 
F.2d 725, 727 (1st Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). See 
also Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 733 (1st Cir. 1994) ("An agreement 
to arbitrate does not deprive a federal court of its 
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute."), affd, [***13] 
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575 U.S. 528, 115 S Ct. 2322, 132 L. Ed. 2d 462 
(1995); Cranston Teachers Ass'n v. Cranston School 
Comm., 120 R.I. 105, 109, 386 A.2d 176, 178 (1978) 
(arbitration agreement does not implicate a court's 
"power to adjudicate a dispute," but merely "raises the 
distinct question whether the court should have exercised 
that power"); John Ashe Assoc, Inc. v. Envirogenics Co., 
425 F. Supp. 238, 241 n.3 (ED. Pa. 1977) ("The 
arbitration agreement [merely] limits the scope of the 
court's review, not its subject matter jurisdiction."). 
Again, the right to arbitration is purely a matter of 
contract. Thus, "arbitration agreements are [as much] 
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
404 n. 12, 87 S Ct. 1801, 1806 n. 12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270, 
1277 n.12 (1967). As with any contract right, an 
arbitration requirement may be waived through the 
conduct of the parties. See Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. 
County Court of Webster County, 143 W. Va. 406, 412, 
102 S.E.2d 425, 430 (1958) (holding that defendant's 
neglect or refusal to arbitrate dispute constituted [***14] 
waiver of right to require arbitration); Pettus, 137 W. Va. 
at 500, 72 S.E.2d at 885 (binding arbitration provision 
requires that '"suit cannot be brought until the award is 
made, unless ... performance is excused by waiver or for 
other good cause'") (citation omitted). We have stated 
categorically that "subject matter jurisdiction may never 
be waived." Dishman v. Jarrell, 165 W. Va. 709, 712, 
271 S.E2d 348, 350 (1980)) (citing West Virginia 
Secondary School Activities Comm'n v. Wagner, 143 W. 
Va. 508, 102 S.E2d 901 (1958)). Obviously, this Court's 
treatment of arbitration as a condition precedent 
otherwise subject to waiver or estoppel is wholly 
inconsistent with it being a jurisdictional prerequisite, 
since the satisfaction of a jurisdictional requirement 
cannot be waived and may be joined in issue by the 
parties or raised by the court at any time during judicial 
proceedings. 
In this case, unless it is able to show good cause for 
its default, Robeson has waived its right to assert 
arbitration as an affirmative defense against continued 
litigation in the circuit court. As an affirmative defense, 
arbitration must be asserted in [***15] the answer or it 
may, under appropriate circumstances, be deemed 
waived pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 8(c). n6 See 
American Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal 
Imaging, Inc., 96 F. 3d 88, 96 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirmative 
[**112] [*169] defense of arbitration must be pled in 
answer); McDonnell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 620 
F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (D. Conn. 1985) ("the affirmative 
defense of arbitration must appear in the answer, and 'a 
party's failure to plead an affirmative defense bars its 
invocation at later stages of the litigation.'") (citation 
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omitted). Moreover, in denying the performance of 
arbitration as a condition precedent, the proponent of 
arbitration must make such an allegation "specifically 
and with particularity." W. Va. R. Civ. P. 9(c). 
Unexcused conduct that results in the entry of a default 
judgment is no less of an implicit waiver of a right to 
arbitration than any other procedural forfeiture. 
n6 Rule 8(c) provides: 
Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
When a party has mistakenly designated a 
defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a 
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a 
proper designation. 
(Emphasis added.) Some courts have held that the 
enumerated requirement of pleading "arbitration 
and award" pertains exclusively to completed 
arbitration proceedings. See Lee v. Grandcor 
Med. Sys., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 
1988). However, Rule 8(c) is not exhaustive, and 
we discern that arbitration clearly falls under the 
catch-all provision of the rule as "any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense." Cfi Greene v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 871 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (N.D. Ala. 1994) 
(waiver question examined in light of catch-all 
provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). 
[***16] 
Consequently, we hold that the mere existence of a 
contractual agreement among litigants to arbitrate a 
dispute does not deprive a circuit court of subject matter 
jurisdiction so as to prevent the entry of a default 
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judgment. n7 Even where arbitration rights are timely 
asserted and judicial proceedings are stayed pending the 
outcome of the arbitration, a circuit court still retains 
jurisdiction over the matter such that any resulting award 
may be judicially enforced. See Miller II, 160 W. Va. at 
496, 236 S.E.2d at 452 (Miller, J., concurring). We 
therefore find no merit in petitioners' argument that the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default 
judgment against them. 
n7 Our research has uncovered only two 
cases that deal directly with the question of 
whether a court has jurisdiction to enter a default 
judgment upon a contract containing an 
arbitration provision. In both of these unreported 
decisions, the courts found no merit in the 
argument that an agreement to arbitrate divests a 
court of the jurisdiction necessary to enter a 
default judgment. See Olde Discount Corp. v. 
RCKCorp., Inc., 110F.3d69, 1997 WL 133239, 
at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) ("Because 
[defendant] failed to assert the arbitration issue in 
a timely fashion, we find no merit to his 
contention that the court should have set aside the 
default judgment.") (citation omitted); Cho Yang 
Shipping Co., Ltd. v. American Freight Lines, 
Ltd., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14918, No. 94 Civ. 
0347, 1994 WL 577006, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 
1994) ("[Plaintiffs] failure to initiate arbitration 
proceedings may have amounted to a breach of 
contract, in which case [defendant] had the option 
of asserting a counter-claim or moving to compel 
arbitration. [Defendant's] options did not include 




For the reasons stated, the requested writ of 






CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
SECTION 1292.2 
§1292.2. Except as otherwise provided in this article, any petition made after the 
commencement or completion of arbitration shall be filed in a court having 
jurisdiction in the county where the arbitration is being or has been held, or, if not 
held exclusively in any one county of this state, or if held outside of this state, then 





CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
SECTION 1293 
§1293. The making of an agreement in this State providing for arbitration to be 
had within this State shall be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enforce such agreement by the making of 
any orders provided for in this title and by entering of judgment on an award under 
the agreement. 
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